The United Nations Security Council, vital for global peace, underscored its importance by adopting UNSC resolution- S/RES/2669 on December 21, 2022. A supposed off-shoot of S/PRST/2021/5- Statement by the Security Council President on March 10, 2021, re-the situation in Myanmar (SCR 2021), a response to the country’s crisis initiated by a 2021 military coup. S/RES/2669 and S/PRST/2021/5 depict Myanmar in chaos from violence against civilians and infrastructure and the detainment of leaders like State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint, leading to a humanitarian catastrophe with mass displacements and widespread poverty. Whereas Kurlantzick (2021) earlier depicted it as a collapsing state and a potential risk to its neighbors. Amid the military coup, ICG (2020) highlighted another factor- ethnicity- driving citizenship, rights, politics, and conflict, leading to deepened divisions, the rise of armed groups, and the militarization of ethnicity. Clements (2020) highlighted this factor, that the Kachin conflict, anchored in ethnic identity, threatens Myanmar’s stability, with the Kachin Independence Army melding military, political, and humanitarian negotiation roles to champion their cause among significant ethnic minorities.
1. Introduction
The resolution-S/RES/2669 emphasizes ending violence, restoring Myanmar’s democratic institutions, respecting human rights, releasing detainees, and pursuing a sustainable political solution aligned with the people’s interests. It further highlights the central role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in mediating and facilitating a peaceful solution while expressing concern over the limited progress in implementing ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus. In light of the complex and troubling situation, S/RES/2669 articulates a clear and pressing call for international cooperation, unity, and action to restore peace and stability to Myanmar.
2. Preambular Clauses
The UN charter preamble clauses commit the global community to peace, human dignity, international law, and global well-being, emphasizing peaceful coexistence and regulating armed intervention (UN n.d.). S/RES/2669 is one of the many UN commitments to uphold these clauses that seek to highlight the critical situation in Myanmar. Citing S/RES/2669, it urgently calls for an immediate end to all forms of violence and strongly advocates for human rights, the rule of law, and the significance of democratic institutions for a peaceful, stable society (UNSCR 2022). Further, these acknowledge the essential role of regional bodies, especially ASEAN, in uniting collective strength and explicitly support the ASEAN-led mechanism and the implementation of ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus, recognizing ASEAN’s contribution to resolving the crisis (SCR 2022). Despite the UN Charter’s Article 2(4) mandate for respecting state sovereignty and non-aggression (UNSC n.d.), Mulakala (2020) suggests that similar South-South Cooperation principles might cause developing countries to withdraw from collaborative efforts or neglect conflicts, believing their activities will remain unaffected. Meanwhile, Secretary-General Guterres champions ASEAN’s role in Myanmar’s crisis, convinced of regional bodies’ role in peace efforts, advocating for global unity and a collaborative approach to end violence and seek a peaceful resolution (UN 2021). The Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network further echoed this, urging ASEAN to prioritize regional protection, coordinate responses, and share responsibilities, highlighting ASEAN’s vital role in protecting its citizens (OCHA 2023). These preamble clauses thus establish the foundation for the subsequent operative clauses, clearly guiding toward peace and stability in Myanmar.
3. Operative Clauses: Resolution’s Main Demand
One of the operative clauses demanding an “Immediate End to Violence” in Myanmar is pivotal to the resolution (SCR 2022). This clause imposes a moral and legal obligation on all parties involved in Myanmar’s conflict to immediately halt all forms of aggression. This includes the military’s “four-cuts” strategy using airstrikes, artillery, and village destruction to displace civilians and deprive rebels of resources and recruits (OHCR 2023). The implications of this clause are far-reaching; halting the conflict is pivotal for negotiating lasting peace, enabling civilians to rebuild and resume normalcy, and giving warring parties a chance to pursue goals non-violently within a regulated framework (USIP n.d.). As Bloomfield et al. (2003, 10) underscored the need for negotiation-designed structures to resolve intra-state conflicts peacefully, emphasizing modern solutions based on human rights principles and democratic structures, which manage differences non-violently. The halt of violence necessitates dialogue among conflicting parties, emphasizing the international community’s role in enforcement and testing their diplomatic skills.
Meanwhile, another resolution’s operative clause is on the “De-Escalation of Tensions,” a crucial aspect of peacebuilding. The clause acknowledges Myanmar’s complex socio-political landscape, emphasizing a comprehensive approach to addressing conflict root causes, potentially fostering political transformation, tolerance, inclusiveness, and respect, and underlining the importance of dialogue, negotiation, and reconciliation for effective conflict resolution. In 2022, Special Envoy Heyzer urged SAC’s Chairman, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, to de-escalate tensions by ceasing bombings, addressing civilian needs, and seeking inclusive solutions for a peaceful, democratic Myanmar (UN 2022). However, amid calls, ongoing clashes between Myanmar’s military and opposing forces intensify the refugee crisis, with UNHCR reporting over 982,000 displacements and many fleeing to neighboring countries (UNSCR 2023), underlining the critical need for de-escalation. The clause is a comprehensive call for peace and stability in the face of escalating tensions, urging for a more diplomatic and reconciliatory approach to the ongoing crisis. On the one hand, putting influential individuals outside the government could aid the de-escalation in Myanmar, echoing successes in other ASEAN nations. In their study, Pelletier and Soedirgo (2017) found that local non-governmental leaders in Malaku, Indonesia are pivotal in reducing violence but need complementary peace systems as mere networks are insufficient.
Similarly, the clause demanding the “Release of Prisoners” is an explicit statement against the prevailing issue of political detentions in Myanmar. It signifies a strong stance against the suppression of political dissent, a persistent issue that has marred Myanmar’s political landscape. This was seen in May 2023 when Myanmar’s military council announced the release of over 2,100 political prisoners for humanitarian reasons (Maung 2023). This clause directly responds to the military’s crackdown on political dissent in Myanmar, which has involved widespread arrests of politicians, activists, journalists, and protesters. The demand for the release of prisoners, including prominent figures like State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint, signifies that the international community is aware of these suppressive actions and is willing to condemn them formally. This clause emphasizes the need to restore democratic norms and uphold human rights. Furthermore, it serves as a reminder to the Myanmar’s military junta of its obligations under international law and sets a precedent for holding accountable those who infringe upon these rights.
Lastly, the “Safe Return of Rohingya Refugees” clause carries significant importance. It addresses one of the most pressing humanitarian crises of our time – the displacement of the Rohingya community. The clause aims to change the Rohingya crisis trajectory, emphasizing the international commitment to refugee rights. It stresses the collective duty of Myanmar and the global community for the Rohingyas’ safe and dignified return, highlighting the current pressing humanitarian crisis. A/RES/74/246 calls for the “safe, voluntary, dignified, and sustainable return of all persons displaced from their homes,” highlighting the dire situation of the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, who, despite their longstanding presence, were rendered stateless by the 1982 Citizenship Law and disenfranchised in the 2015 elections, marking a severe human rights issue (UN n.d.).
To further demonstrate the historical significance of the clause, UNHCR’s “Joint Response Plan for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis” emphasizes the need for a comprehensive strategy to ensure the safe and voluntary return of refugees (OCHA 2019). This plan echoed the principles in the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol (UNHCR n.d.), underscoring that states must protect refugees, respect their rights, and ensure their voluntary right to return home. Moreover, the ICJ (2020) ordering Myanmar to take “all measures within its power” to prevent the genocide of Rohingyas reflects the international community’s commitment to resolving the crisis. This ruling has bolstered the significance of the “Safe Return of Rohingya Refugees” clause, as it is a legal backing to the collective responsibility of the Myanmar government and the international community. In essence, the clause is a testament to the international community’s commitment to upholding the rights and dignity of refugees. However, it also carries significant legal weight, reinforcing collective responsibility and potential repercussions for non-compliance, as stipulated in S/2020/67- Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
4. Assessing Myanmar’s Current Crisis
Myanmar, historically marred by repressive military governance and civil unrest, embarked on a hopeful democratic transition in 2011, only to witness the military’s persistent dominance, ethnic cleansing campaigns against the Rohingya, a 2021 coup, and subsequent civil unrest escalating into a potential regional humanitarian crisis (Maizland 2022), now on a severe humanitarian crisis worsened by military-imposed aid restrictions, as stated by UN spokesperson Ravina Shamdasani (UNHR 2023). During the UK’s Arria-formula discussion on Myanmar, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) stated that 17.6 million people in Myanmar needed humanitarian assistance in early 2023 (SCR 2023). The need for full, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access underscores the severity of the crisis. The situation is further exacerbated by restrictions on delivering critical humanitarian aid, causing distress among the affected needy populations (HRW 2021). Conversely, the plight of the Rohingya people is a significant concern in the ongoing crisis. Over a million Rohingya have fled Myanmar since the 1990s, with 742,000 escaping violence in Rakhine State in 2017. As highlighted in the UN General Assembly document- A/C.3/75/L.34, the international mission on Myanmar identified severe rights abuses against Rohingya Muslims and other minorities by Myanmar’s security forces, constituting major international law breaches (SCR 2020).
5. S/RES/2669 Voting Record
S/RES/2669 passed with 12 votes for, none against, and three abstentions: China, Russia, and India, meriting closer examination. China, a major world power, wields significant influence in Asia. Its abstention might indicate a wish to remain neutral in Myanmar’s affairs, reflecting economic and political interests (GONG 2022). Similarly, ICG (2022) views Russia’s abstention as a move to strengthen ties with Myanmar for geostrategic and economic gains amid tense foreign relations. It signifies Russia’s historical ties with Myanmar’s military, protecting its arms trade and countering Western influence to assert a regional presence (PNF 2022). On the other hand, India’s abstention reflects its balance between democratic principles and strategic interests with neighboring Myanmar. As seen, India prioritized its national and security interests by shifting from a pro-democracy stance to supporting Myanmar’s military, ensuring its look-east policy remains central to its foreign approach (Kipgen 2016).
Rather than undermining the resolution, these abstentions underscore the intricacies of international politics when addressing human rights issues. They illuminate how geopolitical considerations can influence a country’s willingness to condemn alleged human rights abuses, even in the face of global consensus.
6. Objective and Impact
The resolution S/RES/2669 is designed to address the ongoing political and human rights crisis in Myanmar. It was passed at a critical juncture when the international community had become increasingly concerned about the escalating violence, political instability, and the severe humanitarian crisis unfolding in the country, as expressed in S/PRST/2021/5, A/RES/74/246, S/2020/67, and A/C.3/75/L.34 UN documents. The resolution underscores the urgent need for the immediate end of hostilities, reinstating democracy, upholding human rights, and ensuring the safety of the citizens. The potential impact of this resolution is multifold. On the national front, it is expected to pressure the military junta to restore democratic rule and cease human rights abuses. On an international scale, it reinforces the United Nation’s commitment to fostering peace and stability.
7. Background and Broader Themes
Finally, the resolution touches on UN challenges, highlighting India’s “patient diplomacy” -a balanced, non-confrontational approach promoting dialogue and mutual respect and Russia and China raising concerns about the “lack of balance in the text.” All three countries’ stances differ from Western views, a possible hint in S/RES/2669 voting record.
Prime Minister Modi underscores India’s dedication to peaceful global interactions, echoing its Non-Aligned Movement principles. India navigated global politics focusing on balance, mutual respect, and managing geopolitical tensions, prioritizing national interests, strategic alliances, and peaceful diplomacy amidst asymmetric multipolarity (Panda 2023).
On the other hand, concerns raised by Russia and China regarding the lack of balance in the resolution’s text is an important aspect to consider. These nations have often criticized the UN for being used as a geopolitical tool by powerful Western countries to advance their interests, believing international rules reflect and serve their interests over genuine fairness or human rights issues (Grant 2012, 7). The balance in the text of resolutions is critical, as it ensures that the resolution is not biased towards any nation or group of nations and that the focus is on the issue at hand, not on political maneuvering.
Russia and China have expressed their concerns in various UN forums and public statements. For instance, in 2020, Russia vetoed a UN Security Council statement on Libya, with Ambassador Nebenzia calling it unbalanced and “divorced from reality,” suggesting biased blame allocation (Reuters 2018). Similarly, China has often criticized what it perceives as the misuse of human rights issues for political purposes; in particular, Ambassador Zhang stated that US attempts to politicize human rights lack global support, emphasizing that such US tactics are globally opposed (FMPRC 2021).
8. Conclusion
The resolution is vital in today’s global context, addressing various crucial issues. Its Preambular and Operative Clauses give insight into its origins, necessity, and solutions. The Importance of Context, Voting Record, Purpose and Impact, and Background sections deepen understanding, emphasizing global consensus and the role of sociocultural and political factors. Representing unity, cooperation, and respect, the resolution highlights the power of diplomatic efforts in addressing global challenges. It showcases the strength of collective action and reinforces our shared responsibility as a global and regional community for a mutual future.
by: Byron Allatog
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