Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president with deep roots in the spy community, has confounded experts with Russia’s actions in Ukraine in 2014 (Forsberg and Pursiainen 2017) and 2022. Many failed to predict these moves. This essay explores how Putin’s KGB background shapes his decisions, suggesting that it influences him more than his personal views, as noted by Marten (2017). His foreign policy choices underscore this: Putin prioritizes the Special Services and Defense Ministry over the Foreign Ministry (Mankoff 2012, p-9), as seen in his Crimea annexation decision (BBC 2015). His decision-making reflects a blend of centralization, intelligence, pragmatism, and secrecy, highlighting biases that drive Russia’s global and domestic actions.
This essay argues that Putin’s career in the KGB significantly influenced his cognitive biases, shaping his political decisions to unify the Russian people. Putin’s KGB roots intensify his leadership style, making him a global threat. Understanding his decision-making, as explored by Linden and Wilkes (2022), can mitigate risks. Dyson (2001) suggests that the KGB’s rigid ethos enhanced Putin’s penchant for order and strong retaliation. Studying this background offers insight into his actions, like in Ukraine. This analysis breaks down pre-invasion events in Ukraine into two spy strategy tiers: strategic, examining global interactions, and operational/tactical, digging into internal dynamics.
Foreign Policy: Strategic Approaches
Putin’s domestic and foreign actions are intertwined; his pursuit of internal control may be fortified by his foreign policy, with his international behavior possibly eliciting reactions that validate or amplify his power within Russia (Greene and Robertson 2022). The strong connection between Putin’s mission of uniting the Russian people and his foreign policy is that his nationalist and realist political ideologies, compounded by his cognitive biases, are some of the driving forces of his foreign policy, steering decisions on the invasion of Ukraine. With a realist view, Putin sees global politics as national battles and believes threats justify Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Crimea. Thus, preventing Ukraine from joining foreign military alliances-NATO and becoming part of geopolitical groupings is justifiable (Götz 2015). Putting Putin’s strategic realism theorizes his views on prioritizing Russia’s interests and seeking to preserve its power and security when confronted with; Greene and Robertson (2022) argued that the US and European allies, by continually pushing NATO’s eastward expansion, needlessly cornered Russia necessitating a defense or expansion. Driven by Putin’s cognitive bias against perceived threats, Russia’s resurgence and challenge to Western dominance fuel his assertive foreign policies to safeguard and amplify Russian interests.
Putin’s realist and nationalist views, rooted in cognitive biases, emphasize Russian identity and culture, revealing his confirmation bias, which favors information and interpretations that align with and support specific actions (Casad and Luebering 2023). His confirmation bias towards details is negatively impacting international play. For example, the annexation of Crimea was framed as a strategic move and a reclamation of historically Russian territory, thus justifying Russia’s assertive action abroad (Pifer 2020). On the one hand, his realism sees foreign policy’s primary role as bolstering Russia’s power and security. Viewing global affairs as an inherently anarchic and conflict-ridden (NDICS 2022), Putin values ‘power and control,’ embodying the KGB’s direct action approach. Giuliani emphasizes Putin’s leadership quality, noting his swift decision-making, as seen in his rapid securing of parliament’s approval for Crimea’s military deployment (Teh 2022). In Crimea’s annexation and Syria’s intervention, Lewis (2022) notes a preference for authoritarian stability over passive diplomacy. Supporting allies like Bashar Al-Assad, Putin’s belief in strategically supporting Russian allies and active Middle Eastern presence are rooted in his broader ambition to secure and expand Russia’s influence on the global stage. Therefore, adopting Putin’s realist perspective may reinforce his inclination to perceive Russia as threatened, prompting assertive and direct measures to secure its influence in Crimea, Ukraine, and Syria.
Similarly, the anchoring bias, a psychological concept, influenced Putin’s decision-making, leading him to weigh initial information heavily (the “anchor”). In the context of personal beliefs and interpretation, his early experiences or knowledge shape his perception and interpretation of later events (Edgar and Edgar 2016), especially his time as a KGB officer during the Cold War era. Certain perspectives became deeply ingrained during this time, such as the ‘us versus them’ mentality, ‘suspicion and mistrust’, ‘secrecy and deception’, and a focus on ‘power and control’. Stark ideological divisions, territorial contestation, and mutual suspicion between the Eastern and Western blocs marked the Cold War. It is theorized that the perception of group competition over limited resources can foster hostility (Huston 2019). This scenario may function as Putin’s “anchor,” shaping his understanding of geopolitics. Consequently, he views Western countries as adversaries intruding upon Russia’s sphere of influence (Fisher 2022). Moreover, he perceives pro-Western democratic movements in ex-Soviet states, like Ukraine, as threats to Russia’s regime and stability (Person and McFaul 2022). This anchoring bias possibly influenced Putin’s decision to annex Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. Putin has repeatedly stressed Crimea’s historical and cultural links to Russia, implying that the annexation was a means to reclaim Russia’s sphere of influence. He is influenced by his ingrained perception that Crimea is inherently Russian territory and his commitment to undermine Ukrainian democracy as a threat to Russia’s stability. A strategic plan, already in motion, is bound to bring about changes or events in Ukraine in 2022.
Likewise, Putin’s belief that Russians and Ukrainians are one people (Putin 2021) a confirmation bias reflecting his perception of Russia and Ukraine as a unified entity, a precursor that possibly influenced his decision to invade Ukraine in 2022. As conceptualized by Hochschild (2006), Russians and Ukrainians are viewed as the same people (identity), the political division is perceived as immoral, and in Putin’s view, any separation attempts are not believed to originate from Ukrainians’ actual preferences (causation/interpretation). Thus, Putin’s ‘special military operation’ to keep Ukraine from the West reflects a KGB-induced anchoring bias of ‘suspicion and mistrust’ attributes- the perception of threats and counterintelligence mindset. This background amplified his tendency to view other states’ actions as threatening. For instance, the expansion of NATO and the EU into Eastern Europe is seen by Putin as an encroachment into Russia’s sphere of influence and a potential security threat, and his counterintelligence mindset imbibed could be another reason why Putin adopts a defensive posture in international relations preempting potential threats, often resulting in pre-emptive policy decisions. In light of his actions in Ukraine and Crimea’s annexation, aimed at shielding Russia from Western sway, (Roberts 2022) explained Putin’s preventative war strategy arguing that the maintained immediate war was necessary to avoid escalated future threats, turning a potential existential danger into a present one.
Finally, another prospect that defines Putin’s Foreign Policy in defensive posture is the KGB attribute of ‘secrecy and deception.’ In a strategy similar to the Georgia war, Russia annexed Crimea, skillfully using deception to ensure opponents expected a different outcome, leading to a surprising event on March 6 that marked Crimea’s return to Russia after 60 years with Ukraine (Eitel and Hartwig 2021). Influenced by confirmation bias and leveraging his KGB-taught strategic deception, Putin might have emphasized pro-Russian sentiments in Crimea and data supporting his belief of the necessity and feasibility of Crimean’s annexation to create a misleading scenario, thereby surprising the world with Crimea’s annexation. The deceptive wins in Georgia and Crimea may have made Putin believe, due to confirmation bias, that the same strategy would succeed in Ukraine prior to the invasion in 2022.
Domestic Policy: Operational/Tactical Approaches
Putin’s pragmatic domestic policies are deeply rooted in leveraging national sentiments to bolster domestic legitimacy, actions deemed to enhance his global standing and ensure his political longevity. In a defensive realist view, states react to security threats through a ‘balance of threat’ strategy that prioritizes their security, and this involves taking counteractive measures such as laws and policies (Person 2017). Putin’s domestic policies reflect most on authoritarianism, a ‘power and control’ approach. Driven by unique ambitions to restore the past, he tactically uses the right weapons to achieve his goals (Julius 2009). This mindset, shaped by his KGB background, results in a strong central government, control over the media, suppression of political opposition, and manipulation of laws to extend his rule.
Putin’s domestic policy, rooted in his KGB background, emphasizes centralizing political power. Following his aggressive stance in the Second Chechen War, he moved away from the democratic principles introduced by Gorbachev and Yeltsin and pursued centralization regardless of its imperfect implementation (Orttung 2022), mapping out the KGB’s essentials- hierarchy and control. He operationally diminished the autonomy of regional governments, placing them under direct Kremlin control, reflecting his vision of a strong centralized Russia with himself in command. This approach can be seen domestically and in actions like the invasion of Ukraine, which might aim to consolidate power, expand Russia’s geostrategic influence, and reaffirm dominance over former Soviet territories.
Similarly, under Putin, Russia has enacted laws for counter-terrorism and public order. Many see these as suppressing political dissent and civil rights. Echoing his KGB mindset of “the end justifies the means,” Putin believes in harsh punishments for law-breakers (Dyson 2001, p-336). The 2012 foreign agents law aimed to stifle critical NGOs (AI 2016), while the 2016 “Yarovaya Law” revived KGB-like powers to quash opposition (Eckel 2016). The 2014 law against public protests criminalized freedom of assembly and expression (Demirjian 2014), referencing Kyiv’s “Maidan” upheaval (Nechepurenko 2014). By the same token, Putin justifies the Ukraine invasion as protection for ethnic Russians, manipulating the media to support his actions; laws were enacted to control Russia’s domestic media, following KGB tactics of “secrecy and deception.” Media outlets are either state-owned or influenced by his allies, molding public opinion in his favor and limiting government criticism. The Ukraine conflict has underscored Putin’s view of media as a propaganda tool, not a civil institution (Dougherty 2015). His reliance on misinformation complicates adversaries’ predictions and counter-strategies. Putin also enacted laws, including N482-FZ and N511-FZ, to regulate the internet and penalize non-compliant platforms to curb potential online-led dissent (CFR 2021).
Conclusion
Putin’s mission to unify Russians intersects with his foreign and domestic policy. He projects a strong, united Russia, fueling domestic nationalism and furthering national unity. His assertive international tactics reflect his domestic goals. His KGB background shapes these policies, emphasizing “power and control,” “us vs. them mentality,” “suspicion-secrecy-deception,” “centralized power,” “narrative control,” and stringent “law and order.” By championing Russian nationalism and traditional values, Putin seeks to bolster his regime and Russia’s international stature. Ultimately, his overarching aim is to galvanize and unify the Russian populace.
by: Byron Allatog
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