Under President Duterte, the Philippines decided not to pursue the 2016 UNCLOS rulings; such a decision impacted their ability to survey vast oil reserves in specific areas of the South China Sea (SCS). The former President’s policy advisors, who may not have thoroughly understood China’s regional strategic objectives before giving recommendations, could have influenced this decision. As a result, Senator Bam Aquino filed a resolution in the Philippine Senate to scrutinize the government’s foreign policy stance due to concerns over contradictory positions among officials and ambiguous strategic foreign policy objectives (Camonggol 2016). Social media witnessed a trend that endorsed war if the Philippines enforced its rights under UNCLOS and the 2016 Hague Rulings. This trend was fueled by former President Duterte’s policy line, which framed war propaganda for the Filipino masses understanding. The President consistently stated that he would not go to war with China over the disputed sea (Villamor 2017), as it would lead to a massacre (Romero, 2019). Similarly, Duterte’s new foreign policy direction has caused concern among the other ASEAN countries, US and Japan. Leaning on China’s support instead has affected the arbitration ruling and support for the US military presence in Southeast Asia, which is crucial for stability in their relations with China (De Castro 2016a). His policy directives imply that the conflict in the SCS is viewed only as a military matter, treated as a game for the generals to play. This essay contends that by accurately understanding China’s political maneuvers, the Philippines could potentially enhance its strategy in dealing with the SCS dispute, thereby correcting its decision-making approach that seems to misinterpret China’s simple strategy.
Comprehending these dynamics necessitates considering the political objectives and perspectives of the Chinese leadership and the general populace. It also entails aligning military strategies with these political goals to secure an advantage and avoid unintended clashes. Such an understanding of political objectives mandates the application of solutions based on factual, tangible information rather than simply seeking to placate and sidestep conflict or acting under the misleading impression of impending war. This paper will analyze the complex context of the SCS using Clausewitz’s theory that “strategic problems are political problems,” paralleled to Sun Tzu’s “Art of War.” The paper will also explore how understanding political objectives can lead to specific outcomes, like examining China’s strategic moves of “interaction” and “action” concerning policies in developing a foundation for strategic efforts by the Philippines. Also, this essay will focus on three key concepts: First, Carl Von Clausewitz’s central concept that “strategic problems are political problems” where this idea suggests that military action must align with political objectives to achieve a specific outcome. Second, the concept of “interaction” refers to China’s engagement strategies in the SCS to demonstrate its levels of strategy. Finally, this paper will examine the concept of “action,” which shapes China’s perspective; the question of “who is visible in the South China Sea” holds considerable political importance in this viewpoint.
China’s Policy Direction and Theoretical Insights
One factor revealing China’s intentions is its policy direction. Understanding China’s strategies, which can be gleaned from the courses of its policy, as shown in its leadership engagements, can assist in shaping strategic choices for the Philippines. China is committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes, reflected in the different leadership policy statements. During the 9th International Symposium on Sun Tzu’s “Art of War” in 2014, the conference emphasized that Sun Tzu’s teachings advocate peace via development, cooperation, and mutual growth (Whyte 2015). This perspective aligns with President Xi Jinping’s vision of a “New Type of Great Power Relationship,” a policy formulated for mutual respect, collaboration, and avoiding conflict (Rudd 2015). At the 2022 G20 meeting in Bali, President Xi summarized the “20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China’s” key outcomes, highlighting China’s dedication to modernization, public needs, global economic openness, peaceful conflict resolution, and sustained peaceful development (FMPRC 2022).
Conversely, this paper’s theoretical strategic insight is enlightened by the doctrines of renowned Prussian and Chinese military strategists, leading to the development of contemporary strategic thought. Herberg-Rothe (2007) noted that Clausewitz’s idea that war is a modification of political interactions has significantly influenced modern strategic thinking, emphasizing the importance of policy. Similarly, Sun Tzu’s strategy of achieving success through diplomatic and economic means, such as active diplomacy, disrupting alliances, and hindering enemy plans, has relevance today, as demonstrated by past conflicts such as the Punic Wars, Polish wars, World War II, and the Gulf Wars (Królikowski 2016). Throughout these historical conflicts, strategies transcended direct combat, employing diplomatic and economic tactics that resonated with Sun Tzu’s principles. During the Punic Wars, Rome disrupted Carthaginian alliances and constricted their economy. The partitions of Poland echoed Sun Tzu’s doctrine of alliance disruption and non-belligerent territorial acquisition. World War II saw the Allies limit Axis powers’ resource access through economic disruption and alliance-building. The Gulf Wars similarly utilized economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and coalition formation against Iraq. Contemporarily, in political objectives, the Philippines aims to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity in the SCS, particularly in its claimed EEZ under UNCLOS. It also aims to maintain freedom of navigation and promote a peaceful, stable environment for economic development and regional cooperation aligned with the US Indo-Pacific Strategy. In contrast, through its Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI), China had sought to establish its territorial rights over the entire region, as marked by its nine-dash line. The BRI has significantly advanced China’s political objectives, encouraging support for its assertive South China Sea expansion, including artificial island construction (Hulsebosch 2020).
China’s Thinking on the SCS
Examining China’s policy path, informed by Clausewitz and Sun Tzu’s doctrines, helps illustrate Chinese thought. Hence, understanding China’s strategic behaviors in the South China Sea is better achieved by studying Chinese thought processes before concentrating on their actions. Since Chubb (2017) settled that Chinese citizens’ attachment to the SCS issue and its connection to nationalism has been engrained in Chinese thinking since the 1970s, it cannot be manipulated by the state. This approach can benefit the Philippines and neighboring countries in developing adequate responses, a strategic advantage for the Philippines considering its limited resources, as “Sun Tzu (1963) stresses the cost of wars and values a strategist’s ability to win without fighting. ZHANG (2017) identified three unique perspectives within China – the pragmatists, hard-liners, and moderates – each with different stances on its South China Sea (SCS) policy. The “Pragmatists” emphasize preserving rights over stability, advocating for a proactive deterrence-based approach. This viewpoint is mirrored in Beijing’s strategy of using real power and non-military enforcement through law enforcement and paramilitary units. The “Hard-liners,” on the other hand, aim for total control over the SCS to fully exercise their rights, with their most notable influence being the island-building strategy in the Spratly Islands. Finally, the “Moderates” emphasize safeguarding their SCS rights while striving to enhance relations with neighboring countries. They employ a balanced approach that judiciously considers both goals. Comprehending these political viewpoints is paramount. Understanding China’s varied perspectives – the pragmatists, hard-liners, and moderates – provides the Philippines with crucial insights to tailor its SCS policies and strategic responses. Recognizing the pragmatists’ approach helps the Philippines craft counter strategies to China’s power displays and non-military pressures. Awareness of the hard-liners’ ambitions can prepare the Philippines for potential escalations, such as increased island-building, and enable the formulation of apt countermeasures. Acknowledging the moderates’ balanced stance opens doors for diplomatic dialogue, guiding the Philippines to foster policies that capitalize on mutual interests and peaceful negotiations.
Many believe Clausewitz’s and Sun Tzu’s teachings significantly influence China’s policies and mindset. These strategic thinkers emphasized aligning military and diplomatic efforts with political goals to achieve optimal results, ultimately aspiring to win without waging wars. Similarly, despite viewing it as a rational policy tool, they recognized the significance of moral factors and the paradoxical trinity in war. Sun Tzu’s grand strategy incorporated diplomatic and economic considerations, whereas Clausewitz’s analysis began at the strategic-operational level, assuming these factors had already been considered (Howe 2015). The paradox is that while war is fundamentally irrational, it must be managed by rational leaders in government who can balance the competing interests of these three elements; clearly, Clausewitz and Sun Tzu simplified that policies are fundamental in war. Moreover, modern strategic thinking has been shaped by the belief that policy is crucial, which stems from Clausewitz’s idea that war is a modification of political intercourse rather than an independent phenomenon (Herberg-Rothe 2007). Aligning military objectives with political objectives is preferable to competing with China rather than simply seeing it in a war outlook. To add, the four succeeding cases presented will claim their validity.
War is an Extension of Nations’ Political Relations and Conflicts
The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 is a prime example of successful policy objectives in action. The Soviet Union wanted to protect its strategic interests and gain recognition of its sphere of influence in the Caribbean. The US aimed to prevent Soviet nuclear missile deployment near its territory, prevent communism in the Western Hemisphere, and maintain its superpower status. Diplomatic resolution led to removing missiles from Cuba and Turkey without the risk of a catastrophic nuclear war; both sides achieved their primary objectives (Gaddis 2005). The Cuban Missile Crisis highlights the significance of aligning military and diplomatic strategies with political objectives to succeed in a crisis and avert a nuclear war. The crisis, a critical Cold War juncture, commenced when the Soviet Union positioned nuclear missiles in Cuba, near US territories, in response to American Jupiter missiles in Italy and Turkey. The US administration countered with a naval blockade-“quarantine” around Cuba, demonstrating military readiness without sparking direct conflict. Simultaneously, diplomatic talks with Soviet Premier Khrushchev were underway, asserting the necessity for missile removal while promising non-invasion of Cuba. The ultimate political aim was safeguarding the US and its allies from nuclear threats without triggering full-scale war. The alignment of these military, diplomatic, and political strategies effectively defused the crisis, as the Soviets agreed to missile removal in return for the US’s non-invasion commitment and a covert pact to dismantle American missile sites in Italy and Turkey.
The second case- the Falklands War of 1982, highlights the significance of political objectives in a conflict. The war had multiple causes, including a dispute over sovereignty and domestic situations in Britain and Argentina. However, Argentine failure trace back to Argentina’s leaders’ need for a clear strategy. Their inability to assess the British response was due to their nature and advisors’ incompetence (Tulchin, 1987). Similarly, the strategic direction was beholden to the military junta, who believed that seizing the Falklands would unite the people of Argentina around their flag and regime during a difficult time (Ralston 2022). Argentina believes that Britain’s actions, including cutting public spending and withdrawing the HMS Endurance from the South Atlantic, demonstrate a lack of interest and resolve to defend the Falklands. Additionally, categorizing Falkland Islanders as British Dependent Territories citizens have only furthered this belief (Ashton 2018), another setback showing a low fathom of British political points. Moreover, the US renewed interest in the Cold War in South America, resulting in closer military relations with Argentina, which shaped the Argentine military’s national security doctrine (Schmidli 2013), again leading the military junta to believe that the US would not oppose its actions over Falklands. Lastly, Argentina failed to gain international support due to a breach of international principles (Whitescarver 1986), another absence of understanding of the multilateral political system. Argentina’s invasion violated international sovereignty and territorial integrity principles, as outlined in the UN Charter, considering the Falklands were globally recognized as British territories. Similarly, the Argentine leadership failed to leverage diplomatic channels effectively to prevent a military confrontation or secure better terms after the conflict began. The lack of understanding and awareness of the political goals of both own and adversary can lead to misjudgments and potentially result in conflicts. It is essential to clearly understand all parties’ objectives to avoid miscalculations and potential misunderstandings.
On the other hand, the UK’s main objective in the Falklands War was to regain control over the Falkland Islands and maintain its sovereignty. The islands were essential to the UK’s national identity, and losing them to Argentina would have serious political consequences. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher emphasized that the Falkland Islands were British territory, with uninterrupted sovereignty since 1833, and the UK could not allow Argentina to deny the democratic rights of the Islanders (Tudor 2022). The UK’s military strategy and diplomatic negotiations resulted in critical victories, including the Battles of San Carlos and Goose Green, leading to a ceasefire on June 14, 1982. The recapture of the Falkland Islands demonstrated the UK’s military capabilities and commitment to safeguarding its territories and interests aligned with its political objectives.
Similarly, the US failure in Afghanistan and Vietnam emphasizes the importance of understanding local political objectives. The Taliban takeover in Afghanistan reveals Europe and the US’s unsuccessful export of values, democracy, and security (Dempsey 2021). Despite a $2 trillion investment to remove the Taliban from power in 2001, 90% of the population lived on less than $2 a day in 2020 (Sabga 2021). Adversely, opium cultivation has increased by 32% since the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021(UNODC 2022). The US failed in Afghanistan despite having abundant resources because it did not triumph in the local political objective. The US government enforced Western methods on Afghan institutions, including the formal rule of law in a country that depended on informal dispute resolution; this allowed powerbrokers to exploit the people, misuse aid, and cause conflict mitigation efforts to fail, even funding insurgents (SIGAR 2021). Western-led efforts to instate a formal rule of law in Afghanistan conflicted with the country’s traditional, informal resolution systems, leading to unforeseen consequences. Trust and comprehension were higher for local mechanisms like Jirgas or Shuras, challenging the transition to Western structures. This change allowed Afghan powerbrokers with government ties to manipulate the system, often marginalizing ordinary Afghans. Moreover, it paved the way for misusing large international donations, providing opportunities for corruption and funds diversion from public services. This resulted in less effective aid, inadvertently intensifying inequalities and conflicts. The new system also undermined conflict resolution efforts, prompting increased instability and dwindling public trust in institutions. This environment fostered an increased appeal for insurgent groups promising order and justice, making vulnerable Afghans susceptible to their influence. In some instances, the insurgents were directly financed by money earmarked for reconstruction, further escalating instability. Sims (2022) argued that conflicts in Afghanistan and Vietnam were not conventional wars but rather a struggle for the support of the people and the establishment of a legitimate government. Thus, gaining public support was crucial to prevent insurgency growth and establish a legitimate government.
Understanding adversaries’ political goals and strategies is crucial, as demonstrated in historical events like the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Falklands War, and the US failures in Afghanistan and Vietnam. These instances highlight the significance of accurately comprehending the adversary’s political objectives and dynamics, applying a similar principle to the South China Sea (SCS) dispute. For the Philippines, gaining valuable insights from these historical events aligned with China’s political maneuvers in the SCS can enhance its strategy and decision-making process. By drawing lessons from the successful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Falklands War, and the failures in Afghanistan and Vietnam, the essay underscores the importance of accurately understanding political dynamics to avoid conflicts and gain a favorable advantage over adversaries.
China’s Strategy in the SCS
Solving the intricate problems in the SCS requires more than just military posture or war, given that it is occurring within the framework of power politics and hegemonic competition (Moulton 2022). Chinese diplomatic policies proactively build a more substantial global presence and promote a favorable international climate for China (Leverett and Bingbing 2017). Understanding the adversary’s political goals is essential for developing countries to achieve their regional objectives by utilizing available resources and legal structures. In this case, prioritizing economic development, aligning with ASEAN neighbors, raising defense spending, and developing a coherent national security strategy are critical factors in maintaining a strategic balance (De Castro 2016b). As Gray (2016) claimed that politics and strategy are interdependent, the relationship is mutual as politics without strategy lacks a means for achieving its objectives, while strategy without political purpose lacks direction and relevance. The following paragraphs will discuss China’s activities in the SCS and to further help the Philippines shape strategy options and policy direction. The two components of strategy – “interaction” and “action” are the focus.
China’s “interaction” strategy in the South China Sea dispute is exemplified by its indirect actions towards the Philippines, employing a coercive, deterrence-based approach known as the “Scarborough Shoal Model,” reflecting China’s pragmatist thinking. The SCS conflict involves an indirect approach that prioritizes outsmarting other claimant states rather than direct military force. Bringing into line, China’s interaction strategy and policy direction are aligned. For example, at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CCP) held in 2017, Jinping (2017), in his CCP congress speech, supported the SCS artificial island construction as mentioned and interpreted. Aligning the content speech of the Chinese President is a policy direction for China based on strategic options. Xi Jinping’s’ leadership is an all-encompassing approach to national security that has transformed into a fundamental policy principle (Drinhausen and Legarda 2022). China’s artificial islands in the SCS are not primarily meant for military use, Sun Tzu’s deterrent strategy of winning without fighting; China uses them to exert civilian and paramilitary influence to coerce its neighboring claimants to abandon their rights (Poling 2020). Thus, the significance of geography lies in its impact on people, where their perception is more influential than facts. The political implications of representing certain regions on maps have been significant for over a hundred years. This is especially relevant in the case of the artificial islands constructed by China in the South China Sea.
Building on the “interaction” strategy approach, it is driven by a top-down plan that uses tactical engagement to achieve political objectives through military goals. Coercive and deterring actions are fundamental to this model. China’s Coast Guard Law (CCG) is the instrument that authorizes CCG to use force to safeguard China’s sovereignty and maritime rights. The effect was demonstrated by way of CCG vessels contesting Malaysian oil and gas development off the coast of Sarawak since June 2021(AMTI 2021). In February 2023, a CCG ship directed a laser at a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) crew, causing temporary blindness (Hille, 2023). Lately, the Philippine government accused CCG of using “aggressive tactics” near the Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly archipelago on April 23, 2023, CCG vessels came dangerously close to PCG, keeping a perilous distance of only 50 yards (REUTERS 2023). All activities are seen to be coercive. Meanwhile, China’s artificial islands in the SCS are deterrents, dissuading other states from claiming their rights.
On the other hand, China’s “salami slicing” activities in the South China Sea (SCS) represent a deliberate “action” strategy aimed at gradually altering the territorial and maritime status quo of the region. This strategy involves taking small, incremental actions that may not provoke a full-scale war but collectively give China a strategic advantage in the SCS. These activities include land reclamation, constructing artificial islands, establishing military outposts, and enforcing administrative control over disputed areas, enabling China to assert its territorial claims and increase its regional influence. In this strategy, China limits the options of targeted countries and disrupts their deterrence plan of action. This was explicitly seen in the “cabbage strategy” employed, which involves surrounding a disputed area with numerous boats, creating multiple layers of encirclement like a wrapped cabbage, as explained by General Zhang Zhaozhong of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) (Himmelman 2013). Following this, the identified subsequent event is evidence of China’s successful implementation of the salami-slicing strategy. In 2012, China set up “Sansha City” on Woody Island, which serves as an administrative center for China’s claims in the South China Sea. It is vital to China’s regional strategy and works alongside the PLA and CCG to reinforce its sovereignty (Haver 2021). China’s establishment of Sansha City on Woody Island consolidates administrative control, projecting its presence and granting a strategic advantage for asserting claims and influencing the SCS region. This strategy has proven successful against neighboring countries like Vietnam and the Philippines. In the same year, China successfully implemented this strategy against the Philippines by taking control of Scarborough Reef, then later restricted access and prevented Filipino fishermen from returning (Haddick 2014). Layton (2022) viewed these top-down tactical engagements strategies employed by Beijing as the gray zone in action, involving Chinese government agencies and civilian entities with the PLA’s limited participation.
China’s prowess in the SCS is clearly linked to a strategy employed in ancient times. The Athenian Themistocles’ “Wooden Walls of Athens” strategy highlighted naval assets to be able to maintain control of the sea (Dyk 2016); the Chinese “cabbage strategy” is closely related to this. China’s salami slicing was demonstrated in controlling contested areas in the SCS by encircling it using vast maritime assets, cutting sea routes from fishermen, maritime patrols, and even troops food rationing of other countries; “China’s Grayish Gunboat Diplomacy,” where civilian law enforcement and fishing vessels functions as a “small stick” by carrying out patrols in contested waters and upholding their claims of sovereignty and territorial rights (Danby 2022). Correlating both strategies, the “wooden walls” referred to the Athenian ships, which were believed to be the key to victory against the Persian navy, and for China, it is the numerous boats as the “wooden walls” that claimed control over some areas of the SCS and weakened other states’ presence at sea. Moreso, salami slicing in the SCS underscores American strategist, Alfred T Mahan’s idea of “Sea Power” as sea control is pivotal for global influence; the SCS, a vital trade route and potential hydrocarbon source has sparked competing claims over ownership and resources (EIA 2019).
This essay confronting the SCS dispute used strategic concepts, scholarly articles, and historical facts, which aim to determine if war is a matter that should not be solely entrusted to military leaders. It demonstrates that the decision to go to war or the idea about war should involve collaborative decision-making among military and civilian leaders to consider the broader strategic implications of war beyond just military aspects, such as political, economic, and social consequences. In analyzing China’s strategic approach to the SCS, the paper highlights the importance of politics and how it is reflected in its policies, leadership, and laws, which are then implemented tactically and operationally in the SCS through various interactions and actions. Similarly, the significance of aligning military strategies with political objectives is highlighted by the failures of the United States in Afghanistan and Vietnam, Argentina’s objectives in the Falklands, and the victories of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cuban Missile Crisis. This emphasizes that war should not be solely in the hands of military leaders because strategic problems are political problems.
Conclusion
Clausewitz’s analysis indicates that political considerations and objectives underlie strategic problems, such as the decision to engage in war. In light of China’s “actions” and “interactions” in the South China Sea, the Philippines can look to these to identify potential strategic responses and effectively counteract them. A thorough comprehension of China’s political goals, in conjunction with the 2016 UNCLOS rulings, strategic alliances like the 1951 RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, and other agreements with other democratic countries strengthens and projects Philippines’ strategic approach to serving as a powerful deterrence against bigger China. Former President Duterte’s aggressive stance towards war does not reflect China’s overall policy direction. China’s assertiveness in the SCS is part of its larger strategy to assert its territorial claims in the region, as seen in its “action” and “interaction” activities over the years. President Xi Jinping has never viewed war as a viable option for achieving China’s political objectives. Resolving conflicts in the South China Sea falls within China’s political domain. For the Philippines to develop a strategic approach in the SCS without resorting to conflict or the “war with China mentality,” it must clearly understand China’s political objectives. This understanding should be used to identify and take action against the “interaction” and “action” grey zone activities that China engages in while also developing strategic options that align with the Philippines’ political goals of asserting its maritime and sovereign rights based on international law.
by: Byron Filog Allatog
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