Background
Data is power, the oil of the 21st century [1]; former Deputy National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger and David Feith distinguished it as “the indispensable resource that will fuel artificial intelligence, algorithms, economic strength, and national power” [2]. Democratic leaders around the globe have acknowledged that harnessed data is the principal driver for economic growth: Narendra Modi, data is the real wealth [3]; Shinzo Abe, data is a significant gap buster for an economy to move forward [4]; and Angela Merkel, “data will be the raw material of the twenty-first century,” [5].
Similarly, leaders of autocratic countries share the same view but also sight it as a national power. For example, President Xi Jinping sees big data strategy as the core of the digital economy in the technological revolution and industrial transformation [6]. Meanwhile, Russia’s decade’s push for digital sovereignty is perceived as greater control over information, underscoring its importance in securing the country’s future and role in changing the world order [7].
Information is power; data collection and harnessing are the most critical undertakings of powerful states today [8]. Information harvested and harnessed from big data is classified as open-source intelligence (OSINT); In an intelligence and counterintelligence journal report, described as a real-time data collection process using open or public sources [9].
Executive Summary
- Big data is powering OSINT. Social media platforms are big data in practice, and intelligence value can be gathered and harnessed from these platforms.
- Intelligence work is no longer government; anyone with online connectivity can gather and harness troves of information.
- Creating a dedicated OSINT department in each of the ten Australian Intelligence Communities (IC) is a priority task to maximize capabilities and maintain a strategic intelligence advantage (defense and offense posture) both domestically and internationally over adversaries.
Key Developments and Challenges
The last decade showed some of OSINT’s key developments impacting the standard intelligence cycle.
Big data brings new power to OSINT. Social media is a standard of big data seen today. The uncovering of the Syrian use of cluster bombs and exposing the transfer of weapons from Iran to Syria by Eliot Higgins in 2013 from his home harnessing the enormous amount of information spread across the internet is a form of OSINT practice [10].
Ukraine’s invasion by Russia was forewarned weeks earlier by the U.S. with high possibilities, citing intelligence sources mainly from OSINT and other sources; intelligence (OSINT) harnessed from big data sources- social media, taken and uploaded by smartphones [11].
However, behind the prospects of these developments are challenges manifested by some states’ technological advancement and their gray activities undermining other countries.
In 2017, China’s first civil-military cyber security innovation center was unveiled, focusing on cyber-defense systems for military use [13]. Innovation strategy of commercialized militarization translating economic and technological achievements into military power. Correspondingly, PLA is likely spending $1.6bn yearly on AI research & development (R&D) and procurement [14] as compared to Australia’s projected investment of $1.35bn for cyber capabilities over the next decade [15]. China’s innovation is a crucial challenge for the Australian IC, feeling the weight of China’s use of technology in AI R&D and application to strengthen its PLA as AI is an enabler for big data, considering the breaches made in the country’s telecommunication attributed to Chinese spies [16]. On the other hand, young Australians today, like any other growing youth in other countries, are sharing too much personal information with the TikTok entertainment platform leading to a higher risk of data exploitation. At a macro level, the Chinese government could likely use these data for espionage for influence and propaganda, Kris Mansted said [17]. Lately, Chinese link cyber attackers have mined Australian computer systems for months, seeking vital information about defense and energy [18].
See Related Article: https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2023-january-9/
The TikTok data exploitation possibilities can be linked with other Chinese confirmed hacking activities; for instance, “four Chinese militaries were charged with hacking into Equifax stealing personal data of 145 million Americans in 2017 [19]. This Equifax data theft, including other incidents, confirms that not only is stealing innovation central but also personal information (data) is of significant value to the Chinese government. China is building a sea of big data sets for the American people to improve its artificial intelligence capabilities to predict and influence mindset and behavior. A situation that could likely happen to the Australian people. As in the case of Australian TikTok users (dominantly young population), personal data and online data history posted on the platform all contribute to a high degree of future exploitation comparably subject to influencing mindset and behavior affecting the national interest. Sensitive personal data defines a high probability of categorizing subjects prone to spy grooming/recruitment; the worst part is that these young promising Australians’ security clearance and cover are blown up already long before finishing a school degree and entering government service or the intelligence community.
Australian Restructure Response
Covering the key developments and challenges layering OSINT, this paper views that revolutionizing OSINT is the intelligence outlook for Australia. Setting it in the intelligence structure boosts its capabilities to be fully attained in the intelligence domain. Thus, creating a dedicated OSINT department in each of the ten Australian Intel Communities is a priority task to increase strategic intelligence advantage in both domestic and international collection and harnessing of data over adversaries. ONI- OSINT will likewise coordinate and evaluate other national Intel Communities OSINT in the structure.
The prospective task is achievable as it relates only to creating an additional department within the agency, thus not affecting the whole structure and system of the agency concerned and the national intelligence community landscape. For example, the financial allocation would use the existing approved budget allocation of the agency concerned for its first-year implementation until additional resources are supported for the second fiscal year.
OSINT is big data harnessed, and when controlled per agency mandate, it complements other intelligence needs by the government. Protecting Australia is not seen in physical stature alone. A valued intelligence protects the country and its people by providing insights on potential threats and opportunities from enormous data pumped inside the Australian internet domain and assessing probable outcomes for proposed policy options or immediate actions. In doing so, innovating the structure within intelligence agencies to include influencing people’s mindset and work behavior based on current trends- the emergence of big data and AI is of great importance to leverage contentious countries undermining Australia’s values and interests.
by: Byron Filog Allatog
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References:
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