The Indo-Pacific is a newly evolved concept commonly known as Asia-Pacific. In a globalized environment, interdependence develops in many forms creating more excellent connectivity among different parts of the global system [1]. The freshly emerged term represents the reciprocal link with the security dimension― “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue”- Quad (Australia, Japan, India, and the United States) and the “AUKUS” security pact (Australia, U.K., and the U.S.). In like manner, it defines interconnectivity as embodied in the “ASEAN Outlook in the Indo-Pacific.” Similarly, as a concept, it was first codified by Australia in its 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper and lately in the Biden administration’s “U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy.” Thus, the newly evolved concept is expressly vouched. “Indo-Pacific reflects something real in a changing approach by many nations to security, economics, and diplomacy drawing strength and solidarity among its many diverse nations” [2]. Now a regional issue, its emergence was the effect of China’s rising to world power.
China’s rise is inevitable as it is a given sovereign nation’s aspiration to its people. However, its despotic state’s ambition to create and lead a new world order opposing the democratic US-led world order is causing great power competition and is a precursor for conflict. “When a rising power threatens to displace a ruling one, the most likely outcome is war”- Thucydides Trap [3]. Underscoring uncertainty levels in this new great power competition provides different approaches for policymakers and security planners in countries under the Indo-Pacific region to focus on analyzing the type of uncertainty characterizing the state’s environment surrounding the urgent and critical national security threats [4]. Thus, this paper argues that national security is a vital strategy that reduces uncertainties in the Indo-Pacific amidst China’s rise.
For Indo-Pacific countries affected by this extreme power competition, a seamless national security strategy in a “regional strategy context” is needed to cope with the demand for leveraging over the era of rivalry. A regional strategy in this paper is an imagery of the “grand strategy.” However, its difference in the national security context is that its strategic vision must focus and respond to the national priorities of member states across the region. For example, the 2017 Australian Foreign Policy White Paper was produced because strategic leaders and policymakers perceived that the country was entering tough and complicated times. As a middle power, Australia needs to harness all its limited capabilities to project its navigation in the Indo-Pacific [5]. The regional strategy mirrors the grand strategy framework: ends, ways, and means; ends are the objectives, ways are the courses of action, and means are the instruments of national power [6]. Fostering national security is the alignment to the regional strategy; each country’s power sources must be exploited and aligned to fit the grand strategy framework to gain leverage. To gain an advantage, each state in this region needs to strengthen and set the means―its national tools of power- Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME).
The DIME captures national security strength if supported by a country’s strong and vibrant political system, which makes it adaptable to changing times. Political power is an added power tool in this paper to complement the DIME “means” and a requirement in making policymakers fluid to set the DIME to the evolving trend. Reducing uncertainties is the end, national security is the way, and DIME(P) is the means. The DIME is the central discourse in this paper as means to wield all national sources of power in charting a country’s national security framework to forge coalitions in attaining the objective end of reducing regional uncertainties.
Using DIPLOMACY as a national power tool complements other sources of power. For example, it underscores that the best defense is a good defense; in terms of national security, it is a “soft power” deterrence in the strength of collaboration (negotiation and agreements). It manifests in the U.S. Integrated Deterrence approach as its Defense Secretary advocates. “Deterrence has always been the first line of defense, and preventing conflict, when possible, is greater than engaging” [7]. Undoubtedly, diplomacy is one crucial instrument used by governments to pursue national interest and leverage in the international arena and is a significant role player in preventing wars and resolving conflicts [8]. Great power competition is felt in the Indo-Pacific, where both U.S. and China’s interests lie, and discord, tension, and conflict are visible in trade, geopolitical, and institutional domains [1]; causing uncertainties in each country and the whole regional sphere. The affected countries in this region must invest in diplomacy to assert an order that protects their sovereignty from any coercive power and must not be defined by the rivalry between the two great powers. Diplomacy brings collective leverage to the region’s needs for a sustainable and workable regional strategy. It flexes a joint stance against these two superpowers. It sends a message that countries in this region are democratic and sovereign active participants (and the liberal idea of consensus is mandatory), not passive recipients. It was underscored by Australia’s vision of leadership in the Indo-Pacific to lead by example and call out the U.S. to get its house in order [9]. Thus, wielding influence in these countries is forging regional coalitions built on participative leadership and dialogue partners. For the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy to work in the region, acts must go beyond geopolitical attacks and rhetorical beliefs; investing more in effective engagement with the region deepens economic bonds and leverages the democratic “soft power” assets of education and innovation [10]. This soft power asset harnesses the limited capabilities of these developing countries. Once equipped, it can forge other states’ power to counter uncertainties. This soft power, being implied known as the “containment doctrine” in the Cold War, is a policy prescription that is relevant today. It sets the U.S. strength through economic achievement and diplomatic leadership as an example rather than relying solely on military muscle, which is an impulsive solution [11]. The strength of a diplomatic alliance is a unique strategic advantage in a resolute policy cornering defense on allies [12]. Thus, partnerships or coalitions like “minilateral” for economic and trade pact agreements of states in the region are vital as they contribute to the region’s overall security posture―having one voice and a collective stand against coercion by rising states reduces uncertainties in the region.
Similarly, INFORMATION is another soft power instrument aimed toward acquiring data from other states and processing information control as desired by other state and non-state actors. In today’s globalized world, information power safeguards national security and is characterized by two folds: information technology and information content. Information technology increases military and economic power in the digital age, while information content is used to form public opinion, trust, perceived legitimacy, and overall appeal [13]. The South China Sea and Taiwan are in China’s eye; both lie within the Indo-Pacific region, making it a more contested region. A region of rivalry where the adoption and integration of technology-enabled grey zone activities into statecraft are purposely employed by China as a matter of state policy. It is expressly seen in President Xi’s military dialectics, The Great Theoretical Value on the “Overall Operation of War Actions and Use of Military Forces in Peacetime” [14]. Information technology and information content are entrenched in these gray zones using sophisticated technology to improve electronic warfare and communication capabilities; in SATCOM, SIGINT, and COMINT in the South China Sea [15], the same technology to amplify the state-crafted message to justify the physical activities of coercions in the area. Relatedly, a matter of interest and application for Beijing’s all-out psychological warfare campaign against Taiwan, using disinformation and fake news as the chosen tool to erode the country’s legitimacy [16].
Undoubtedly, similar warfare was employed in the Philippines from 2016 to 2022. It was manifested through widespread propaganda in the “operation naval gazing” that supported Chinese regional influences, its policies in the South China Sea, and information operation during the national and local elections in which gains were credited to politicians leaning toward Chinese sentiments [17]. In like manner, Australia and the U.S. are increasingly burdened with security alarms due to the increased sophistication of information operations, and both have shared the same experience for the past decade [18]. All of the following indications are marshalled in China’s vision: A “world-class military” by 2050 where the PLA is the center of its innovation to leverage national defense in big data and artificial intelligence supporting an algorithm-based approach to great-power competition and armed conflict [19]. Understanding China’s vision and gray zone activities manifest the country’s overarching security objectives in the Indo-Pacific (China’s priority region) to alter the regional status quo in its favor [20]. Left unchecked, these gray zone activities employing information power will diminish U.S. democratic dominance and its authority and goodwill in the eyes of ASEAN and Pacific countries. For a nation to fail to prepare adequately is to concede strategic defeat. Thus, the U.S. must reassure its allies and revisits diplomatic-based treaties targeting information technology innovation to be felt by these countries as these are the surest way to leverage national security strategy in countering gray zone threats of information operations in the Indo-Pacific, thus reducing uncertainties.
Another aspect that illustrates strength is the MILITARY, an integral element of national power: a “hard power.” The military is one of a state’s core institutions, a powerful organization with the capacity and mandate under the law to use lethal violence to secure its people and nation’s interest [21]. Ideally, the number of armaments is a factor to gauge in terms of military capabilities such as supercarriers, destroyers, submarines, tanks, ballistic missiles, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. Many other assets and factors considered are not seen, which can and often do prove more decisive in the outcome of a war.
Lowy Institute identified these unseen factors and considered assets inside the Indo-Pacific rim’s military capability and are measured conventionally: defense spending, armed forces, weapons and platforms, signature capabilities, and Asian military posture [22]. Defense spending is one critical factor in seeing a country’s military capability, as defense spending also equates to the economic power factor of a country. For developing countries, this would be unwise from an economic theory perspective as there are more priorities in growth and development. However, peace and stability are arguably foundational elements for any thriving economy. Giving firms the confidence to invest and people the space to flourish and a strong defense is regrettably necessary for a strong economy [23]. It is important because developing countries inside the Indo-Pacific sphere of influence need to expand military capabilities in terms of an increased defense budget to defend their territorial claims and deter China’s aggressive and coercive stance. It is not a matter of a trade-off between guns and wheat, but in a world of uncertainties, the truth is that both guns and wheat are essential. In like manner, the Asian military posture is a convenient measure of power in reducing uncertainties in the Indo-Pacific. Targeting Australia, it ranks sixth among countries-U.S., China, India, Russia, and South Korea in the ability to deploy rapidly for a sustained period in the event of an interstate conflict in Asia [24]. Thus, Australia’s plan to secure eight nuclear-powered submarines in its maritime fleet increases not only its country’s Asian military posture and military capability but also reduces uncertainties in the Indo-Pacific; the first measure under the AUKUS security pact under the technology sharing partnership [25].
Another interesting viewpoint is that as geopolitical instability increases and uncertainties are evident, several countries increase their defense spending to increase the required responsibility for citizens’ defense and protecting values and interests. Defense spending is directly associated with economic power as it prescribes how far a state can spend based on economic position. ECONOMIC power defines a state’s ability to protect or advance economic interests in circumstances that may threaten or block these interests [26]. Similarly, the economic power of a country is weighted by its GDP at purchasing power parity as it extends to international leverage, technology advancement, and connectivity in shaping the global economy [27]. From academic and policy understanding, economic power has been a core component of national security over the years. In addition, it powers the country’s statecraft using economic means to pursue foreign policy objectives such as the Indo-Pacific strategy and the 2017 Australian Foreign Policy White Paper to pursue national aspirations and interests. Undeniably, economic relationships like trade relations and investment ties are linked to national security in capacitating the power of a state to influence and leverage other countries. The economic future is in the Indo-Pacific; dozens of countries, including the US, India, Japan, and Australia, acknowledge the richness and diversity of the vibrant regional economy [28]. Moreover, with the vast economic opportunities that lie ahead for the region detailed in the “Indo-Pacific economic framework,” many risks and uncertainties come along; great power competition is escalating uncertainties.
Nevertheless, powering the economic factor of all regional states gives countries better military upgrades and influences that support reducing uncertainties. Let alone the newly established Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), a U.S. economic commitment to power the Indo-Pacific economy. IPEF is a modern regional arrangement built for cooperation and economic integration that not only supports the global rules-based trading system in the Indo-Pacific [29]; but also capacitates other national sources of power in every country to address regional uncertainties brought about by China’s rise. Finally, POLITICAL power was an added discourse as it indicates that domestic political conditions in affected states play a crucial role in determining whether DIME inducements are aligned and meet their objectives. Politics is machinery in a liberal country that symbolizes democracy, the balance of powers, and importantly charts the country’s aspirations; as expressed in Burke’s famous ‘trustee’ view, “parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole,” [30]. In national security, all four means of power incorporate political factors. For example, the 2017 Australian Foreign Policy White Paper, for instance, was charted to manifest Australia’s values as a critical component of the foundation in which the country engages internationally; it was scrutinized by Parliament, involving debates about costs, trade-offs, and priorities [31]. Similarly, the U.S. 2023 Defense spending bill went through a strict evaluation before lawmakers’ approval, incorporating a $40 billion supplemental funding for Ukraine and its neighbours” [32]. Moreover, the domestic political conditions in a country extend beyond its borders in an interconnected region; political power transcends this DIME beyond foreign relations and partnerships to the regional security framework. It is a crucial role player in meeting DIME objectives in reducing uncertainties in the Indo-Pacific.
This paper has shown that the grand strategy framework ends, ways, and means outline this paper’s objective of reducing uncertainties in the Indo-Pacific by using national security in linking the national sources of power-DIME to a regional strategy condition. DIME is a military term in its nature. Exploiting it reminds states to view national power as not limited to the military only; the success of the national security strategy depends on how other sources of power are harnessed and linked to accomplishing a well-defined and robust national security. Thus, the uncertainties in the Indo-Pacific caused by China’s rise can be reduced by harnessing the national sources of power by all states in the region complemented by allied superpowers’ regional partnerships. It involves states fine-tuning their approach to national security in a “whole-of-government” approach; simply harnessing the DIME is putting all government machinery at play and aligning these to foreign policies of other states that are beneficial to the interest of the region. All these reduce uncertainty levels in the Indo-Pacific.
Diplomacy power builds mutual relationships of states in the region governed by democratic ideals and strengthens the state and the region’s overall security posture; having one voice and a stand against coercion by bigger states reduces uncertainties in the region. In comparison, information power leverages national security strategy to identify and counter gray-zone threats of information operations by identifying the characteristics employed. Meanwhile, military power influences developing countries inside the Indo-Pacific sphere and the need to expand military capabilities in terms of an increased defense budget to defend territorial claims and deter China’s aggressive and coercive stance. Lastly, powering the economic factor of all regional states gives countries better military upgrades and influences. When the four sources of national power are linked by political dimension, it will extend the relevance of its national security framework and give importance to multilateralism and inked agreements to leverage uncertainties caused by great power competition.
by: Byron Filog Allatog
__________________________________
References:
[1] R. G. Patman, P. Köllner, and B. Kiglics, “From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific : diplomacy in a contested region,” 2022.
[2] Rory. Medcalf, Contest for the Indo-Pacific : why China won’t map the future. Carlton, Victoria: La Trobe University in conjunction with Black Inc., 2020.
[3] G. Allison and A. Andrew Hastie, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’ Trap? Brunswick, Victoria: Scribe Publications, 2017.
[4] I. Popescu, “Strategic Uncertainty, the Third Offset, and US Grand Strategy,” vol. 46, no. 4, p. 13, Dec. 2016, doi: 10.55540/0031-1723.2999.
[5] Rory Medcalf, “Australia’s Foreign Policy White Paper: Navigating Uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific,” SECURITY CHALLENGES, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 33–39, 2018.
[6] P. Layton, “Military strategy fundamentals,” vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 105–114, Jul. 2022, doi: https://doi.org/10.51174/AJDSS.0401/JTYZ5777.
[7] T. Lopez, “Defense Secretary Says ‘Integrated Deterrence’ Is Cornerstone of U.S. Defense,” U.S. Department of Defense, Apr. 30, 2021. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2592149/defense-secretary-says-integrated-deterrence-is-cornerstone-of-us-defense/ (accessed Sep. 15, 2022).
[8] U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “Resolving conflicts: Diplomacy works,” U.S. Embassy in Georgia. https://ge.usembassy.gov/resolving-conflicts-diplomacy-works/ (accessed Sep. 16, 2022).
[9] B. Wood, “Australia’s vision of leadership in the Indo-Pacific,” East Asia Forum, Jul. 15, 2020. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/07/15/australias-vision-of-leadership-in-the-indo-pacific/ (accessed Sep. 20, 2022).
[10] H. Ha, “How to forge Regional Coalitions,” THE INDO-PACIFIC OPERATING SYSTEM. https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/indo-pacific-operating-system/essays/forge-coalitions/ (accessed Sep. 14, 2022).
[11] S. Hoadley, “George Kennan urged American leadership and patience to counter the Soviets. Instead, the Cold War ensued,” The Conversation, Aug. 14, 2021. https://theconversation.com/george-kennan-urged-american-leadership-and-patience-to-counter-the-soviets-instead-the-cold-war-ensued-156306 (accessed Sep. 16, 2022).
[12] M. O’HANLON, The Art of War in an Age of Peace. Yale University Press, 2021. doi: 10.2307/j.ctv1mgmd1k.
[13] Masahiro Kohara, “Information power and international security,” Progress in informatics, vol. 1, 2005.
[14] Y. Ying, “What is the purpose of the use of military power in peacetime?,” China Military, Nov. 17, 2016. http://www.81.cn/jwzl/2016-11/17/content_7364178.htm (accessed Sep. 17, 2017).
[15] M. Funaiole, J. Bermudez, and B. Hart, “China Is Ramping Up Its Electronic Warfare and Communications Capabilities near the South China Sea,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, Dec. 17, 2021. https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-ramping-its-electronic-warfare-and-communications-capabilities-near-south-china-sea (accessed Sep. 19, 2022).
[16] M. Rira, “Taiwan Under Siege: Behind China’s Gray Zone Operations,” nippon.com, Mar. 24, 2022. https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d00787/# (accessed Sep. 16, 2022).
[17] G. Winger, “China’s Disinformation Campaign in the Philippines,” Diplomat (Rozelle, N.S.W.), 2020.
[18] A. Kapetas, “Challenges for the US and Australia in the grey zone,” The Strategist, May 06, 2021.
[19] E. Burke, K. Gunness, C. Cooper, and M. Cozad, “People’s Liberation Army Operational Concepts,” RAND Corporation, RR-A394-1, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA394-1.html
[20] B. Lin, C. Garfola, Bruce, and J. Blank, “A New Framework for Understanding and Countering China’s Gray Zone Tactics,” RAND Corporation, RB-A594-1, 2022. Accessed: Sep. 16, 2022. [Online]. Available: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RBA594-1.html
[21] N. Wilen and L. Strombom, “A versatile organisation: Mapping the military’s core roles in a changing security environment,” EUR J INT SECUR, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 18–37, 2022, doi: 10.1017/eis.2021.27.
[22] Lowy Institute, “Asia Power Index,” Lowy Institute Asia Power Index 2021 Edition, 2021. https://power.lowyinstitute.org/explore/military-capability/
[23] The Economist, “What bigger military budgets mean for the economy,” Apr. 16, 2022. https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2022/04/16/what-bigger-military-budgets-mean-for-the-economy
[24] Lowy Institute, “Asian Military Posture,” Lowy Institute Asia Power Index 2021 Edition, 2021. https://power.lowyinstitute.org/data/military-capability/asian-military-posture/ (accessed Sep. 19, 2021).
[25] A. Nicholls, J. Dowie, and M. Hellyer, “Implementing Australia’s nuclear submarine program,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Dec. 14, 2021. https://www.aspi.org.au/report/implementing-australias-nuclear-submarine-program (accessed Sep. 18, 2022).
[26] C. R. Neu and C. Wolf, “The Economic Dimensions of National Security,” RAND Corporation, MR-466-OSD, 1994. [Online]. Available: https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR466.html
[27] Lowy Institute, “Economic Capability,” Lowy Institute Asia Power Index 2021 Edition, 2021. https://power.lowyinstitute.org/explore/economic-capability/ (accessed Sep. 19, 2022).
[28] The White House, “Statement on Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity,” May 23, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/statement-on-indo-pacific-economic-framework-for-prosperity/ (accessed Sep. 17, 2022).
[29] DFAT, “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework,” Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/organisations/wto-g20-oecd-apec/indo-pacific-economic-framework (accessed Sep. 20, 2022).
[30] S. Brenson, “Representative roles and responsibilities,” Parliament of Australia. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/APF/monographs/What_lies_beneath/RepresentativeRoles (accessed Sep. 18, 2022).
[31] C. Hill, “Australia’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper: what role for the Parliament?,” Parliament of Australia, Dec. 14, 2017. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/FlagPost/2017/December/Foreign_Policy_White_Paper_Parliament (accessed Sep. 20, 2022).
[32] B. Harris, M. Eckstein, S. Losey, and J. Gould, “House Democrats rebuke calls to raise spending in defense bill,” Defense News, Jun. 15, 2022. https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2022/06/14/house-democrats-rebuke-calls-to-raise-spending-in-defense-bill/ (accessed Sep. 20, 2022).