Recurrently, the military and the police accentuate public and civil affairs by dispensing public information and conducting civic actions on the national border. In consonance with this, police visibility has become an ongoing fad in the uniformed service that has favored the hearts and minds of the people in the community through radiating an inherent sense of security and protection in the country; most especially to the far-flung or remote areas where people tend to seek quality livelihood absent of any potential threat or danger that may hinder that objective where the presence of CTGs (Communist-Terrorist Group/s) is likely included.
“Keep your friends close, and your enemies closer,” an excerpt Sun Tzu, the author of the book Art of War, was and is still being credited for. This delineates that a man born of the war times knows that keeping your enemies within reach is more valuable than owning tens of thousands of allies. This is because law enforcers who battle against multitudes of crimes and injustices are obliged to be low-key omniscient; to distinguish the ally from the enemy, without the factor of vulnerability on our side as combatants of the government or even to befriend a former enemy or enemy itself to achieve a crucial purpose.
Wielding the correct information holds an overwhelming power when it comes to influencing people in the long term. In actuality, it may either destroy or build fortresses depending on how it was utilized by the courier. It is perceptible why police visibility and conduct of information drive on particular areas within the targeted Area of Responsibility (AOR) has become the main agenda of the PNP toward reaching a modest amount of information and vice-versa; to gain public support by underpinning the pros in line with public service.
Civil-Military Operations (CMO), on one hand, gain differently to some degree. As opposed to the PNP that uses Police-Community Relations (PCR) to counter-insurgency by earning the public trust and support, the CMO in triad operations under the AFP works congruently with Operations, Intelligence, and CMO that does not only aim to keep the neutrals (e.g., friendly forces or supporters) quite informed and safe, but also, the renegades at bay.
CMO set off using an “out of the box” but coequally indispensable viewpoint in dealing with the insurgents. It operates before, during, and after military operations in white and red areas where it fixates on maneuvering combat or attacking forces and manages the impact of the military operations on both the civilian and enemy forces.
Generically, CMO is riveted with planned activities undertaken independently or in coordination with civilian entities to reap popular support, weaken the enemy’s will to fight, and project a positive image within the public and the community on behalf of the accomplishment of the AFP mission.
Now, how does this make CMO ever different from PCR?
PCR plays a vital in both Public Affairs and Public Information that lies under the control of the PNP. The former, however, does not stick to one function but three different yet adjacent pillars, hence, the CMO triad concept: Public Information (Public Affairs or Community relations), Civil Affairs (Civic action and Civil Relations), and PsyOps (Psychological Operations), aiming the same goal as the latter, thus, confers disparity as to its level of intricacy and MOE (Measure of Effectiveness).
Psychological Operations (PsyOps) raise the bar of this variance when approaching the enemy. It is a CMO pillar conducted to influence the BEBOA (Beliefs, Emotions, Behaviors, Opinions, and Attitudes) of target audiences such as the enemy and its mass base and supporters, to redirect inauspicious attitudes and behaviors into something favorable, and to transform confident attitude and behavior from being passive to active to accomplish the mission, especially of the AFP. It is the planned use of activities and other measures encompassing the military, political, economic, and ethical or social which are aimed at influencing the BEBOA of a target populace to accomplish the mission of the armed forces.
We call the PsyOps triumvirate: three pillars within a pillar (PsyOps). PsyOps is part of the CMO Triad Concept, bearing three independent pillars that work simultaneously to achieve its purpose: counter. These three include the Words ISA, Deeds ISA, and Counter PsyOps (the most salient pillar under PsyOps).
Words ISA involves the production and dissemination of information, concept, or idea through various media to influence the attitude and behavior of the TA (i.e., enemy and supporters). This pillar includes the production and distribution of printed materials (e.g., leaflets, brochures, comics, posters, books, streamers, and billboards), production and presentation of audio, visual, and audio-visual products (e.g., documentaries, TV and radio plugs, the conduct of radio programs, and puppet show), face-to-face dialogues, symposia (e.g., dialogues conducted by the AFP with the TA to deliver Psyops messages), production of information technology related products (e.g., text messages and internet-based operations).
Deeds ISA are action-oriented activities used to complement the objective of the former. This second pillar includes combat activities (e.g., checkpoints, a show of force, and deception activities, combat operations), Non-combat activities (e.g., mobilization of stakeholders, the conduct of rallies and demonstrations, guerilla theater operations, use of equipment or other resources to gain initiatives or prevent enemy actions, and other CA-oriented activities).
Counter Psyops or Counter ISA, nevertheless, are activities responding to enemy propaganda, hence the alias, counter-propaganda. This Information Support Affairs (ISA) uses preventive and counter-actions. Preventive actions inform and expose the friendly troops and population to the nature of the enemy propaganda and help them understand their vulnerability to propaganda by informing them of enemy propaganda themes that may be employed against them. Counter-actions contrariwise are measures used to reduce or neutralize the effects of the opponent’s propaganda, which include direct refutation, diversion, silence, restrictive measures, imitative deception, conditioning, forestalling, and minimization, among others.
It is futile, however, if these three pillars did not jive with the notion, “…keep your enemies closer”. As the CMO triad represents, to complete the process, CMO must work on both intelligence with a synced correspondence to conducting operations: combative and non-combative. Use of the correct information is as destructive as the use of the wrong one; ergo, getting accurate intelligence must be put to mind at all costs to prevent misinformation; along with building and establishing good rapport within your respective AORs for a more proactive and trusting community, which is the most tangible counter-propaganda, the government can bring to the table against any form of insurgency.
by: Precious Shermaine Lee
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About the Author:
Precious Shermaine Lee is a former student of Bachelor of Arts in Journalism at Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Sta. Mesa Manila and graduated 3rd in the final order of merits of PNPA’s Alab-Kalis Class of 2022. She also graduated as the valedictorian in her recent Public Safety Officers’ Basic Course class, receiving the Dr. Jose P. Rizal Academic Excellence Award at the Philippine Public Safety College (PPSC) in Camp General Mariano N. Castañeda, Silang, Cavite. Currently, she is a student in Civil-Military Operations Basic Course at the CMO Group, Philippine Navy.
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Disclaimer
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